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REMNANTS OF RECENT CUSTOMS
LITIGATION:
JURISDICTION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Claire R. Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper briefly will comment on two separate issues
implicated, but not clearly resolved, in two recent and impor-
tant customs cases. Both cases, United States v. United States
Shoe Corporation' and United States v. Haggar Apparel Com-
pany,' originated in the Court of International Trade ("CIT")
and reached the Supreme Court. They were the first to do so in
many years.3 In U.S. Shoe, the Court held the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax ("HMT") assessed upon exports from the United
States violated a rarely invoked prohibition of the United
States Constitution, the Export Clause.4 In Haggar, the Court
mandated Chevron analysis5 for judicial review of a regulation
issued by the United States Customs Service ("Customs") relat-
ing to the tariff classification of imported goods.6
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wish-
es to express her gratitude for Brad Coven's research assistance and for the very
helpful comments of Paul A. Horowitz, Amy J. Johannesen, and Suzanne I.
Offerman. The author appreciates the support of the summer research program at
Brooklyn Law School.
1. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
2. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
3. As this paper is being written, a third case, United States v. Mead Corp.,
- U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000), cert. granted, - S. Ct. -, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566
(May 30, 2000), 2000 WL 249135, is about to be decided by the Supreme Court in
the 2000-01 term. Mead addresses some of the questions left open by Haggar.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (the "Export Clause") provides: "No Tax or
Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."
5. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that when faced with statutory ambiguities, courts must defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of the statutes they administer).
6. "Tariff classification" involves the determination of which product descrip-
tions (numbering approximately 10,000) in the U.S. tariff statute are applicable to
particular imported goods. Classification is one of the elements of assessing cus-
toms duties on imported goods, because the applicable rate of duty for each prod-
uct description is set out in the statute adjacent to the product description. See
generally 1 EUGENE T. ROSSIDES & ALEXANDRA MARAVEL, UNITED STATES IMPORT
TRADE LAW 11 (1998).
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The legal and economic impact of U.S. Shoe is outstand-
ing. The case provided the Supreme Court with its first oppor-
tunity to revisit the Export Clause in more than 70 years. The
case spawned an entire cottage industry of Export Clause liti-
gation within the CIT7 and beyond.' The case also was sig-
nificant because the potential refunds to taxpayers were in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. The constitutional issues in-
volved in U.S. Shoe have been dealt with elsewhere.9 The col-
lateral cases still are working through the courts, and probably
will be for some time.'0 What I would like to briefly address is
the jurisdictional issue resolved in U.S. Shoe, and how its
resolution further supports longstanding calls for a renovation
of the CIT's jurisdictional statute." My comments on the ju-
7. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1997); IBM v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000), petition for cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3259 (Sept. 28, 2000) (No. 00-482) (the taxes paid in violation of
the Export Clause entitled to interest); Baxter Healthcare v. United States, 925 F.
Supp. 2d 794 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (exporters are not a certifiable class for pur-
poses of a class action); Stone Container v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 10, 2001) (No. 00-1131) (statute of limita-
tions applies to export clause challenges) and (pendency of class action tolls stat-
ute of limitations); Swisher Int'l v. United States, 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 624 (2000) (exporters may file a Customs Form 350 to
seek the return of illegally paid HMT); Amoco v. United States, 234 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (HMT on imports is constitutional); Thomson Consumer v. United
States, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (importers must protest HMT
on imports in order to file suit in the Court of International Trade); Florida Sugar
v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (HMT on domestic movements is
constitutional); BMW v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999)
(HMT on Foreign Trade Zone Shipments is constitutional); Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2741
(2000) (HMT on passengers is constitutional); Texport v. United States, 185 F.3d
1291 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (HMT is not subject to drawback).
8. See Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, Nos. 97-68 T, 97-310 T, 97-
311 T, 97-317 T, 97-521 T and 97-522 T (consolidated) (Fed. Cl. 1997) (challenging
the constitutionality of the Black Lung Excise Tax under the Export Clause);
Ranger Fuel Corp. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same).
9. See Claire R. Kelly & Daniela Amzel, Does the Commerce Clause Eclipse
the Export Clause: Making Sense of United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 84
MINN. L. REV. 129 (1999).
10. See cases cited supra note 7.
11. For a discussion of the gaps in the CIT's jurisdictional statutes, see Scott
H. Segal & Stephen J. Orava, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Article: Playing the Zone and Controlling
the Board: the Emerging Jurisdictional Consensus and the Court of International
Trade, 44 Ahl. U. L. REV. '2393 (1995); Proceedings of the Ninth Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Court of International Trade, The Court of International
Trade-Is It Time To Look At Expanding The Court's Jurisdiction?, 161 F.R.D.
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risdictional issue in U.S. Shoe do not support a different result
in that case. They merely identify a jurisdictional gap-one
among many-that should be rectified by Congress. 2
In contra-distinction to the jurisdictional remnant of U.S.
Shoe, I also would like briefly to discuss a significant (and
possibly an outcome-altering) issue that was side-stepped in
Haggar. The Supreme Court's holding in Haggar that Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 3 ap-
plied to customs regulations, appears to be just the beginning
in a re-examination of customs law and the CIT's role in statu-
tory interpretation of the customs laws.' Chevron sets out a
two-step method of analysis for judicial review of an adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of a statute it administers.
First, the court uses traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion to determine independently whether Congress has spoken
to the precise statutory interpretation question at issue." If
congressional intent is clear, the court enforces legislative
intent regardless of the agency's interpretation of the statute.
But if the court determines that Congress left the statute si-
lent or ambiguous, the court turns to the second step of Chev-
ron analysis. 6 Under the second step, the court assesses
whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable." When the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, the reviewing court will
"defer to" the agency's interpretation. 8
547, 581 (1994); Lynn S. Baker & Michael E. Roll, Securing Judicial Review in the
United States Court of International Trade: Has Conoco, Inc. v. United States
Broadened the Jurisdictional Boundaries?, 18 FORDHAm INT'L L.J. 726 (1995).
12. See Patrick C. Reed, Expanding the Jurisdiction of the United States Court
of International Trade: Proposals by the Customs and International Trade Bar
Association, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 819 (2001) (for a comprehensive treatment of
the jurisdictional gaps in the CIT's jurisdictional statute).
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that where a statute contains ambiguity the
court will first look to determine whether Congress spoke to the precise issue and
if congressional intent is not clear, the court will accept an agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute it administers).
14. In fact, the issue decided by the Supreme Court in Mead will begin to
address the applicability of Chevron analysis in a non-regulation context. For a
complete assessment of the applicability of Chevron in customs litigation, see
Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Unto the Breach: Reconciling Chev-
ron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel
Company, 49 AM. U. L. REV. - (2000).
15. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 845.
18. See id. at 843-44.
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Haggar, as a descendant of Chevron, poses significant
pitfalls for the unwary. Patrick C. Reed and I outlined some of
our concerns and predictions about Haggar elsewhere. 9 Of
course, one question is whether Haggar should apply to Cus-
toms Service interpretations embodied in formats other than
notice and comment regulations.0 Presently the Supreme
Court is reviewing that issue.2
I believe that many of the Haggar pitfalls can be avoided if
one understands statutory interpretation in the customs con-
text. Simply, the CIT uses a host of unique interpretive tools
which may resolve many of the potential Chevron/Haggar
cases in step one of Chevron analysis. Although there has been
considerable dispute about interpretive methodologies, includ-
ing, specifically, the rise of textualism in step one of Chevron
cases outside of the customs context,22 the applicability of the
CIT's interpretive repertoire is not subject to the same criti-
cisms. Many of the CIT's interpretive tools are novel to cus-
toms cases and date back to the beginning of customs cases,
indeed to the beginning of this country." Moreover, these
tools were designed and used as a matter of course in light of
the particular interpretive issues that arise in customs cas-
es.' Thus, in this commentary I will briefly explore and ex-
plain that the CIT, if it must apply Chevron/Haggar analysis,
may be able to end its inquiry at step one of Chevron. The CIT
often may be able to resolve the meaning of the contested term
19. See generally Kelly & Reed, supra note 14.
20. See generally id.
21. See Mead, - U.S.-, 120 S. Ct. 2193.
22. For a sampling of the literature, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Leg-
islative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423
(1988); Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player?" Justice Scalia and Admin-
istrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 50 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1639 (1991);
Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretations and Deference for Justice
Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1670 (1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995).
23. See generally PATRICK C. REED, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN U.S.
CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1997) (detailing the development of judi-
cial expertise for the adjudication of customs and international trade cases).
24. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. For example, the meaning of
a tariff term often involves commercial ideas and comparative application of prod-
ucts.
[Vol. XXV:3864
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using its repertoire of interpretive tools. Admittedly, most of
these tools are employed in "classification" cases, but the CIT's
expertise and adaptability in customs law interpretation carry
over into non-classification cases as well.25
II. U.S. SHOE AND JURISDICTION
In U.S. Shoe, the CIT reviewed a challenge to the Harbor
Maintenance Tax which involved an ad valorem charge against
the shipment of goods through United States harbors. Al-
though the HMT applied to imports, domestic movements, and
exports, the challenge in U.S. Shoe focused only upon the ap-
plication of the HMT to exports. The challenge claimed that
the imposition of the HMT violated the Export Clause of the
Constitution which prohibits any tax or duty from being laid
on any articles exported from any State.26 The Supreme Court
eventually affirmed the decisions of the CIT and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC").27
The CIT disposed of the jurisdictional issue rather handily
and its decision was affirmed on appeal by the CAFC and the
United States Supreme Court.28 The CIT is a court of exclu-
sive jurisdiction and needed to identify a specific jurisdictional
grant within its jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1581, in
order to hear the dispute in U.S. Shoe. Rather than initially
referring to its own jurisdictional statute, the CIT turned to
the Water Resources Development Act ("WRDA7)29 which im-
posed the HMT. The WRDA implied that disputes over the
HMT were to be resolved in the CIT. Specifically, section
4462(f)(2) of the WRDA provided:
(f) Extension of provisions of law applicable to customs du-
ty.-
(1) In general-Except to the extent otherwise provided
in regulations, all administrative and enforcement pro-
25. See supra note 6, explaining "classification." Non-classification cases involve
a host of other issues relating to the appraisement and entry of merchandise and
includes inter alia valuation, country of origin marking, and drawback. See also 19
U.S.C. §§ 1401a, 1304, 1313 (1988).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
27. See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995). U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
28. See U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
29. I.R.C. §§ 4461, 4462 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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visions of customs laws and regulations shall apply in
respect of the tax imposed by this subchapter (and in
respect of persons liable therefor) as if such tax were a
customs duty. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
any penalty expressed in terms of a relationship to the
amount of the duty shall be treated as not less than the
amount which bears a similar relationship to the value
of the cargo.
(2) Jurisdiction of courts and agencies-For purposes of
determining the jurisdiction of any court of the United
States or any agency of the United States, the tax im-
posed by this subchapter shall be treated as if such tax
were a customs duty.3"
Thus, the language in the WRDA did not specifically confer
jurisdiction upon the CIT, rather it characterized the HMT as
a "customs duty."3 '
After referencing the WRDA, the CIT also sought guidance
in the legislative history of the Customs Court Act of 1980
which gave the CIT jurisdiction over import transactions. 2
The CIT determined that the legislative history of the Customs
Court Act indicated that the CIT had "inherent responsibility
to review challenges to the constitutionality of a law within
that area of expertise."33 This inherent responsibility, corn-
30. I.R.C. § 4462(f)(2). See also Legislative History, S. REP. NO. 99-228, at 10
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6705, 6715.
31. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408. The courts treat this characterization as
dispositive in the final analysis. Their reasoning suggests that the only implication
of this characterization was that the CIT must have jurisdiction.
32. Congress' purpose in centralizing jurisdiction over import transactions in
the Court of International Trade was to dispel the jurisdictional confusion existing
as to the Court of International Trade's predecessor, the Customs Court, and to
reflect the true scope of the court's jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, at 47
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3758-59. As the legislative history of
the Customs Courts Act of 1980 shows, Congress sought, by permitting a single
court to hear these suits, to eliminate much of the difficulty experienced by inter-
national trade litigants who in the past commenced suits in the district courts
only to have those suits dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Ac-
cordingly, Congress granted the court exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action
against the United States arising out of federal laws governing import transac-
tions, because of the court's already developed expertise in international trade and
tariff matters. U.S. Shoe, 114 F.3d 1564 (citing Conoco, Inc. v. United States For-
eign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
33. See U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410-411. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1331, 1585
(1988) (providing this court with all powers of U.S. district courts including origi-
nal jurisdiction over actions arising under the Constitution). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
[Vol. XKVI:3866
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bined with the CIT's view that it was the proper forum for
disputes involving import transactions, ultimately served as
the basis of the CIT's finding that it had jurisdiction over the
refund claims."
Finally, the court considered its jurisdictional statute after
it noted that the parties agreed the CIT had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1581, but disagreed as to which subsection gov-
erned. The two proposed alternatives were 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
and (i). Subsection (a), ("protest jurisdiction") provided:
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the deni-
al of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.3"
Protest jurisdiction allows an importer to file suit to contest
the denial of its "protest" of a customs decision under section
515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.36 The protest must be made
within 90 days of a customs decision. If Customs denies the
protest, the importer can challenge that denial in the CIT.
Unfortunately, the subject of the protests delineated within
section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 did not include specifically
the circumstances surrounding the HMT. Importers may pro-
test any charge or exaction "of whatever character within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary."8 However, the charge or exac-
tion must be the result of a customs decision.3 9 As the CIT
noted, there was no "decision" to be made by Customs with
respect to the HMT. Customs served a mere ministerial func-
255(a)(1) (1988) (permitting designation of three-judge CIT panels to hear and
determine constitutional issues).
34. Specifically, the CIT pointed out that due to "the Court of International
Trade's traditional role as the proper forum for review of actions governing import
transactions, the court possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the constitu-
tionality of the Tax." U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 411.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1988).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1988).
37. Thus, although an action to contest the denial of a protest has a six
month statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2636, the requirement that
an importer protest an entry within 90 days of a customs decision would have
resulted in a de facto ninety day statute of limitations.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3).
39. See id.
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tion and had no discretion to pass upon the issue of whether
the HMT was constitutional.4 °
The government admitted that protest jurisdiction was not
an exact fit, but it argued that the plaintiffs proposed alterna-
tive, subsection (i) ("residual jurisdiction") was not an exact fit
either. Additionally, it argued that the expansion of liability
which would occur if the court chose residual jurisdiction
should militate against the finding of residual jurisdiction, as
the basis for jurisdiction.4'
The government's claim that residual jurisdiction did not
provide the CIT with jurisdiction had merit. The residual juris-
diction provision, subsection 1581(i) provides:
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of
International Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and
subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of this
section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United
States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law
of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the
matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsec-
tion and subsections (a)-(h) of this section. "
The CIT's examination revealed that its "residual jurisdic-
tion" under subsection (i) did not clearly encompass the chal-
lenge either. Although the HMT was applied to "import trans-
actions," the claim in U.S. Shoe involved exports. Exporters
claimed that the HMT violated the Export Clause which pro-
hibits the imposition of any tax or duty on any article exported
40. See U.S, Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 420.
41. See id. at 418.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Section 1581(i) is subject to a two-year statute of
limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). Section 1581(a) is subject to a 180 day statute of
limitations which begins to run upon the denial of a protest. 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a).
However, a protest must be filed 90 days of a "decision" by Customs. Thus, juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a) effectively would impose a 90 day statute of limi-
tations on exporters who wanted to challenge the HMT. See 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a)
(providing that a "civil action contesting the denial . . . of a protest under section
515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless . . . within one hundred and eighty
days after . . . denial of a protest . . . ."). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) (provid-
ing that a protest must be filed within ninety days of liquidation of the entry."
[Vol. XXVI:3868
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from any state." Thus, the claim for refunds arose from ex-
port transactions."
Nevertheless, the CIT found that subsection (i) was the
appropriate basis of jurisdiction. The CIT reasoned:
Congress directed the tax be treated as a customs duty for
purposes of jurisdiction. Such duties, by their very nature,
provide for revenue from imports, and are encompassed with-
in subsection 1581(i)(1). 45
Thus, it appears that the CIT treated the WRDA's charac-
terization of the HMT as a "customs duty" as dispositive of the
CIT's jurisdiction. In doing so, it appears that the CIT (as well
as the CAFC and the Supreme Court) presumed that the sole
or at least primary basis of such a characterization would be to
vest the CIT with jurisdiction over constitutional challenges
(and all challenges) to the HMT.
No court addressed a simple flaw in the CIT's analysis. If
the characterization in the WRDA of the HMT as a "customs
duty" was intended by Congress to give the CIT jurisdiction
over all challenges to the HMT, Congress simply could have
provided that "[the CIT shall have jurisdiction over all claims
involving the HMT." Thus, it is at least arguable that the char-
acterization of the HMT as a "customs duty" was meant to give
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
44. Certain amici contended the denial of a refund request pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 24.24(e)(5) was a protestable decision, and that subsection 1581(a) provid-
ed the appropriate basis for jurisdiction. The CIT rejected this contention finding
that "[a]lthough Customs has discretion to decide whether it is able to refund
payments of the Tax, such discretion is limited and does not extend to determina-
tions of constitutionality. As Customs does not have the power to decide the con-
stitutionality of the Tax, the court finds protestable decisions pursuant to the
refund provision of subsection 24.24(e)(5) are limited to decisions pertaining to the
administration of the Tax, not its constitutionality." U.S. Shoes, 907 F. Supp. at
421. (This claim was eventually specifically rejected by the CIT in Swisher Int'l,
Inc. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 2d 234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998), but accepted by
the CAFC in Swisher Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 624 (2000) (No. 00-415)). The Court did not consider
whether the jurisdictional mandate for the "administration and enforcement" of the
HMT could be treated differently than a constitutional challenge to the HMT. Yet,
the Court has in other contexts distinguished statutory instructions relating to
judicial review. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (preclusion of
judicial review pertains only to the claims arising out of the administration of
enforcement of the Veterans' Readjustment Act and not to claims challenging the
act on First and Fifth Amendment grounds).
45. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 421.
20011 869
BROOK. J. INTL L.
the CIT something less than jurisdiction over all claims sur-
rounding the HMT.
For example, another plausible interpretation of the lan-
guage in section 4462(f)(2) of the WRDA is that the CIT would
have jurisdiction over matters relating to the HMT to the ex-
tent it implicated a protestable Customs' decision. For exam-
ple, if Customs had made an error regarding the dutiable value
of the merchandise and thus overcharged the HMT, the im-
porter could protest the overpayment of the HMT. Ultimately,
I think that the CIT should have been the court authorized to
hear the case, but I believe the language of the WRDA and the
CIT's jurisdictional statute fail to make that result clear.
The CAFC relied on a slightly different rationale than the
CIT and seemed to reach the conclusion that subsection (i)
applied out of a default. Subsection (i) is thecourt's basis of
residual jurisdiction, and thus, in some sense, is a default rule.
However, the CAFC's default analysis appeared to rely upon
the notion that some CIT provision must apply (since the par-
ties all agreed that the CIT did and should have jurisdic-
tion)46 and the view that subsection (i) was a better fit than
subsection (a). Thus, the CAFC explained:
Given that the Court of International Trade did not possess
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), if it possessed jurisdic-
tion over this dispute, as the government concedes that it did,
it can only have been pursuant to the default provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i).47
Subsection 1581(i) is a default provision because it can
apply only in those limited circumstances when jurisdiction
under any of the other subsections is unavailable or manifestly
inadequate4 The court found that "subsection (a)-the only
46. It seems inappropriate that the court give significant weight to the fact
that all the parties had agreed that the CIT was the right court to bring the case.
First, the court must address subject matter jurisdiction regardless of the parties'
agreement. Second, some did not agree. The first suit challenging the constitution-
ality of the HMT was brought in the district court in Maryland under the Tucker
Act. See Am. Ass'n of Exp. and Imp. v. Benston, No. L94-1839 (D. Md. filed July
1, 1994). It seems that the plaintiffs in Am. Ass'n of Exp. and Imp. v. Benston,
did not agree with the CIT's statement because they were not in fact parties in
the CIT litigation. See also AGP, L.P. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 607, 1998 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 222 (1998).
47. U.S. Shoe, 114 F.3d at 1570.
48. See Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
[Vol. XXVI:3
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other arguable possibility-is unavailable."49 However, subsec-
tion (i) is not completely "residual" because it not only has
negative criteria, it has positive requirements which must be
satisfied before it may serve as the basis of the CIT's jurisdic-
tion in a particular case. One positive criterion of subsection
1581(i) is that the challenge must involve imports.
However, the CAFC sidestepped the "imports" requirement
contained in subsection (i) by relying upon the fact that "Con-
gress expressly directed that for jurisdictional, administrative,
and enforcement purposes, the HMT was deemed to be a cus-
toms duty. Thus, it is beyond dispute that Congress intended
the Court of International Trade to have jurisdiction over dis-
putes regarding the HMT, as the Court of International Trade
has exclusive jurisdiction over customs matters."0 The court
acknowledged that subsection "(i) does not specifically refer to
disputes concerning the constitutionality of fees such as the
HMT." 5 However, the court went on to note that subsection
(1)(4) granted jurisdiction to the court for matters concerning
the "administration and enforcement" of any law providing
revenue from imports.52
The court claimed that the constitutional challenge did
"involve the administration and enforcement" of a law provid-
ing for revenue from imports because the HMT, although chal-
lenged as applied to exports, did apply to imports as well.53
That subsection 1581(i) does not use the word "exports" was
not dispositive, as it "was intended to give the Court of Inter-
national Trade broad residual authority over civil actions aris-
ing out of federal statutes governing import transac-
tions .. .
The Supreme Court's analysis mirrored that of the CIT. It
dispensed with the CAFC's rationalization that although sub-
section (i) related to exports, the jurisdictional statute applied
accord Norcal/Crossetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Nat'1 Corn Growers v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
49. U.S. Shoe, 114 F.3d at 1571.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581, 1588
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
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because the HMT was imposed on imports as well. Instead it
stated:
The key directive is stated in 26 U.S.C. § 4462(f)(2), which
instructs that for jurisdictional purposes, the HMT "shall be
treated as if such tax were a customs duty."55
The court used the Export Clause itself to excuse the ab-
sence of the word "export" from section 1581(i). "True, section
1581(i) does not use the word 'exports.' But that is hardly sur-
prising in view of the Export Clause, which confines customs
duties to imports. Revenue from imports and revenue from
customs duties are thus synonymous in this setting.""
Nevertheless, one could argue that Congress's directive
was limited to administration and enforcement of the HMT,
and thus the United States Court of Federal Claims or a dis-
trict court would have had jurisdiction for the recovery of an
unconstitutional payment under the Tucker Act.57 In fact, one
case was brought in district court pursuant to the Tucker
Act.58 Because the Court determined that the CIT had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over challenges to the HMT under § 1581(i)(4),
it found that the Court of Federal Claims and the district
courts lacked jurisdiction over the challenges to the HMT
pending there.
Although I agree that the CIT was indeed the right place
for the HMT case, the inadequacy of the jurisdictional statute
and the Court's contortions of it weigh in favor of Congress
taking a fresh look at the CIT's jurisdiction. The CIT is best
suited to hear all challenges regarding the assessment of du-
ties or fees made in connection with imports or exports. It is a
specialized court that has amassed considerable expertise in
dealing with international trade. Moreover, its national juris-
diction fosters uniformity and predictability in trade disputes.
Congress should revise the Court's jurisdiction to include mat-
ters relating to exports as well as imports: Bureau of Export
regulations, for example. Congress should specifically enumer-
ate constitutional claims relating to import, export, and trade
55. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 366.
56. Id.
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1994).
58. Am. Ass'n of Exp. and Imp. v. Benston, No. L94-1839 (D. Md. filed July
1, 1994).
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laws to be within the CIT's jurisdiction.59 Further, Congress
should revise the CIT's residual jurisdiction to include all
claims involving exports or imports not specifically provided for
in the current jurisdictional statute. Other calls have been
made in this regard and they should be heeded."
III. HAGGAR AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The remnants of Haggar likely will be strewn throughout
customs litigation in the future.61 If Chevron itself is any indi-
cation, it would appear that the CIT will host numerous bat-
tles over whether to extend Haggar's limited holding.62 Like-
wise, I would not be surprised if there are not at least a few
misapplications of the doctrine. In this commentary, I argue
that even assuming Haggar's extension to other customs dis-
putes, the CIT's vast array of interpretive tools enable it to
ascertain the meaning of a statutory term independently so
that it may avoid Chevron deference in many cases.
Haggar's breadth and limited applicability aside, one
should appreciate that Chevron analysis, and thus Haggar
analysis, is a two-step process where the court in the first step
59. The legislative history of the Customs Court Act of 1980 indicates that
initially Congress considered a more explicit listing of the types of actions within
the CIT's jurisdiction, but this approach was rejected in favor of more generic
language. See generally REED, supra note 23, at 173.
60. See Reed, supra note 12. The Court of International Trade has recently
established an advisory committee to seek legislation expanding the CIT's jurisdic-
tion.
61. See, e.g., Mead, 185 F.3d at 1304 (finding that Customs ruling letters lack
the force of law and were not entitled to Chevron analysis because they lack pro-
cedural safeguards, public debate or discussion); Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United
States, 201 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying "Chevron deference" to Customs
interpretation of its own regulation); Salant Corp. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 2d
1301 (Ct. Intl Trade 2000) (avoiding the application of Haggar to Headquarters
Ruling Letters by deciding that the value statute in question addressed the specif-
ic issue within its plain language); Cummins Engine Co. v. United States, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 1366 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (relying on Mead reasoning that NAFTA
advance rulings made pursuant to 19 C.F.R § 181.99 are "neither precedential nor
carry the force of law").
62. For empirical studies on the application of Chevron analysis, see Peter H.
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Feder-
al Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1026 (1991); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Stat-
utes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994).
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independently determines whether Congress has spoken to the
precise issue in question. 3 This first step is essentially a task
of statutory interpretation. If the court can discern Congress'
singular meaning or clear intent, then the second step, that of
deference to a reasonable interpretation by the agency, is un-
necessary. In my view the result of this first step in customs
cases often will obviate the need for application of "Chev-
ron/Haggar deference."
The CIT has special rules of statutory construction which
will resolve interpretation issues in many, if not most, of the
cases before it. The traditional areas of customs litigation,
which account for the majority of the customs decisions in the
CIT, are classification and valuation.' In classification cases,
the CIT employs a variety of tools, including the General Rules
of Interpretation65 ("GRIs"), the common meaning doctrine,66
the Explanatory Notes,67 the use tests,68 and the authority to
consider dictionaries, lexicons, and even hear expert testimo-
ny.69 As one commentator already has noted, these tools will
often enable the CIT "to make its own independent interpreta-
tion of the tariff statute in all or nearly all cases."" I will
briefly explain these tools and demonstrate the CIT's use of
these tools to resolve ambiguities in classification cases. There-
after, I will demonstrate the CIT's interpretive tools in some
non-classification cases. I argue that these tools make the CIT
63. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
64. Customs revenue laws are different from the usual areas of administrative
law in which the Chevron doctrine has developed and has generally been applied.
This idea is reflected in the CAFC's 1997 decision in Anhydrides & Chem., Inc. v.
United States, 130 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which sets out the principle
or interpretive maxim that revenue statutes are to be strictly construed, with any
ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the Government. See
Kelly & Reed, supra note 14 (arguing that revenue statutes and remedial statutes
should be treated differently when determining whether Chevron analysis applies).
65. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
68. See RUTH F. STURi, CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION § 53.3 (3d ed.,
Oceana 1999).
69. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
70. Proceedings of the Ninth Judicial Conference of the Court of International
Trade, 161 F.R.D. 547, 644 (1994) (quoting the comments of Patrick C. Reed). In
classification cases, one can argue that "tariff terminology is intrinsically precise
because it denominates tangible articles bought and sold in commerce." Brief of
Amici Curiae Filofax Inc. at 9-10, United States v. Mead, 120 S. Ct 2193 (2000)
(2000 WL 1193076).
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uniquely qualified and especially entrusted71 to end the Chev-
ron inquiry at step one.
Before explicating the CIT's interpretive powers, it is
worth noting that outside of the customs context, a debate has
arisen over the degree of statutory interpretation which must
be undertaken by a court in step one of Chevron."2 I will not
comment on that debate here because, in my view, it does not
directly affect the application of Chevron in the customs con-
text.
The interpretation of customs statutes is as old as this
country and since the beginning, specialized customs tribunals
have sculpted a unique set of tools to interpret the statutes in
light of the normative goals of customs law."3 At the same
time, customs tribunals have historically applied a larger set of
statutory construction tools more commonly employed in more
general legal contexts."4 Likewise, interpretations of customs
statutes also are susceptible to theoretical justification and
analysis. Theories of textualism, intentionalism, purposivism,
or dynamism can be, and have been, applied to customs laws
to serve both normative and prescriptive designs."5 Applica-
tion of these theories are woven throughout customs cases in a
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640 (1988) (requiring the court to conduct de novo re-
view).
72. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765 (1999)
(Chevron deference did not apply to the facts because the FTC's reading of the
statute was "clearly the better reading of the statute under ordinary principles of
construction"); Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) ("In determining whether Congress has spe-
cifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself
to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning-or ambigu-
ity-of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.")
See also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) ("Ambiguity is a creature not
of definitional possibilities but of statutory context"). Cf. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). For a review of the academic de-
bate, see Merrill, infra note 103, at 969; Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Place for a Legislative History of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2000)
(arguing that courts should make use of all valuable interpretive materials rather
than rushing to defer to the interpretation that "an incumbent administration
finds most convenient at the moment.").
73. See STUIM, supra note 68.
74. See id.
75. See id. at § 52.6 (explaining common meaning doctrine as generally re-
quiring that words be interpreted in their popular sense, unless clear legislative
intent to the contrary is found); id. at § 52.7 (explaining when a specific commer-
cial designation may overcome a common meaning); id. at § 53.2 (explaining the
use of re nomine designations).
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variety of patterns. Studying these patterns reveals that many
potential Haggar progeny can be disposed of by means of stat-
utory interpretation in the first instance.
Although I do not want to go on about different interpre-
tive methodologies that may be used to understand a tariff
term, I do want to suggest that familiarity with these method-
ologies may be helpful in the customs context. These methodol-
ogies seek to provide a landscape of interpretation and are
themselves validated by understandings of democratic legiti-
macy.7" Nevertheless, interpretive methodologies are at least
somewhat indeterminate, even if that indeterminacy is over-
stated at times.7 The CIT can start with the words of the tar-
iff term, or seek to ascertain the drafters' intent. The CIT may
do both and still recognize that tariff terms must operate with-
in a rapidly changing business context and thus interpretation
of them should be "dynamic,""s i.e., account for the values pro-
tected in the statute in light of societal or other changes over-
time. 9 I would propose that those values are identifiable in
76. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitima-
cy and Legal System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 272 (1997).
77. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in The Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 440-42 (1989) (explaining "[c]laims about the inevitable indeter-
minacy of interpretation usually suffer from a failure to take account of the con-
textual character of linguistic commands").
78. Even though dynamic interpretation is most often called for when social
values are implicated, the constant evolution of international trade may be suit-
able for the methodology. In short, dynamism seeks to understand the social con-
text in which the legislation was enacted and allow interpretation to evolve in
consideration of how those social contexts have changed. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra
note 76, at 335. I believe that analogous shifts in business dealings and practice
can be identified to allow for a dynamic interpretive approach to customs statutes
in some cases.
79. As Professor Gebbia-Pinetti points out, ultimately the theoretical methodol-
ogy should account for not only the legitimacy of the statutory construction but
the legal values sought. Dynanicism, for example, perceives a meta policy and
translates that meta policy through time to allow the statute (its interpretation) to
evolve. Dynamic theories:
(i) accord courts a policymaking or lawmaking role through statutory
interpretation, (ii) permit courts to use sources extrinsic to and subse-
quent in time to the enactment of statutes, in at least some circumstanc-
es, to guide policy choices, and (iii) expect courts to consider not simply
the extent to which their rulings honor legislative mandates (i.e. institu-
tional accountability), but also the consequences of their rulings in indi-
vidual cases and for the larger society.
Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 76, at 337-42.
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the customs context and can aid in statutory interpretation.
The customs tribunals which eventually evolved into the
CIT have a long history of using unique interpretive tools to
ascertain the correct meaning of customs statutory terms given
the values promoted by the customs statutes. The CIT's spe-
cialized mandate stems from its evolution from administrative
agency, to Article I court, to Article III court. Although the CIT
has the same powers as a district court, and occupies the same
level in the federal judicial hierarchy as district courts, it oper-
ates under distinctive governing statutes and is the latest in a
series of specialized tribunals or courts for customs litiga-
tion.8" Traditionally, independent review in customs cases was
thought to stem from the court's jurisdictional statutes which
provided for de novo review.8' The CIT is charged with reach-
ing its own independent determination on the factual issues.82
The CIT also is charged with de novo review of the law. 3 The
CIT's interpretive powers, the scope of its review and its exper-
tise make it a court particularly adept at resolving (avoiding)
putative statutory ambiguities. The following passage will be
familiar to most customs practitioners as it is often cited as a
preamble of sorts in customs classification cases:
First, tariff terms are construed in accordance with their
common and commercial meaning... and it is presumed
that Congress framed the tariff acts according to the general
usage and denomination of the trade ... Second, the common
meaning of a tariff term is a question of law to be determined
by, the court... In answering the question of a term's com-
mon meaning courts may consult dictionaries, lexicons, scien-
tific authorities and other reliable sources as an aid...
Third, the meaning to be given a descriptive term used in a
tariff act is that which it had at the time of the law's enact-
ment.8 4
80. See generally REED, supra note 23.
81. Interestingly, Justice Scalia once remarked, that in Chevron, had the
Clean Air Act provided for de novo review, the agency would not have been enti-
tled to deference. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpreta-
tions of Law, 1999 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1999).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (1994). See also Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States,
112 F.3d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d
488, 491-93 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (1994) (providing de novo review of the denial
of a protest by the Customs Service).
84. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 649 (Ct.
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Customs tribunals ascertained the scope of tariff terms (as well
as other statutory terms) long before the current battles over
interpretive methodologies arose."
A. An Overview of Interpretive Tools
To interpret tariff terms, the CIT first resorts to a host of
sources to divine the meaning of the term at the time of enact-
ment, independent of the Customs Service's view. As with all
statutory interpretation cases, finding the meaning of the
terms begins with the statute. Customs law involves several
statutes, but the most prominent of these is the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS)."6 The HTSUS
has a number of component parts. The text of the HTSUS, i.e.,
the statute, "consists of the General Rules of Interpretation;
the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation; the General Notes;
Sections I through XXII, inclusive (encompassing chapters 1 -
99, and including all Section and Chapter notes, head-
ing/subheading numbers through the 8-digit level, article de-
scriptions and tariff and other treatment accorded thereto); the
Chemical Appendix; the Pharmaceutical Appendix; and the
Intermediate Chemicals for Dyes Appendix. The statistical
annotations, notes, annexes, suffixes, units of quantity, and
other matters formulated under section 484(f) of the Tariff Act
Int'l Trade 1984), affd, 753 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The principle that tariff
terms be ascribed the meaning that they had at the time of enactment would of
course be an exception to the notion that customs statutes can be interpreted
dynamically. See supra notes 71 to 73 and accompanying text.
85. See REED, supra note 23, at 286 n.37 (citing Stone & Downer Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 12 Ct. Cust. 62, 70 T.D. 40019 (1923)) ("Tariff law, while subject to the
same rules of construction and legal principles for the most part of other legisla-
tive acts, yet have during a century and a half of application acquired certain
characteristics not found in other legislation, and certain definite principles of law
which have been laid down by the courts in construing tariff laws which of neces-
sity do not apply to other kinds of legislation.").
86. The U.S. tariff schedule, the HTSUS, is based on an internationally uni-
form system of product nomenclature known as the Harmonized Commodity De-
scription and Coding System, usually called simply the Harmonized System. Each
participating country agreed to adopt the Harmonized System as its national tariff
statute. See International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System, opened for signature June 14, 1983, __ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
- [hereinafter HTSUS]. The statutory provisions adopting the HTSUS are codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3012. The HTSUS is nominally codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1202, but in fact is not published in the Code and, instead, is published as a
separate document by the U.S. International Trade Commission. See also 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202 (1988).
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of 1930 comprise the statistical parts of the HTSUS."7 Thus,
in any cases where the statute in question involves a tariff
term from the HTSUS, the court necessarily will consult the
plain meaning of the HTSUS itself, as enlightened by the Gen-
eral Rules of Interpretation (GRI), the Section Notes and
Chapter Notes set forth at the beginning of each of the eleven
sections and ninety-nine chapters respectively, and any rele-
vant appendices.
Rule 1 of the GRI of the HTSUS is the starting point for
an analysis of classification under the HTSUS. It provides:
The... titles of sections, chapters and sub-chapters are pro-
vided for ease of reference only; for legal purposes, classifica-
tion shall be determined according to the terms of the head-
ings and any relative section or chapter notes and, provided
such headings or notes do not otherwise require, according to
the following provisions [indicating GRI 1, 2, 3, et seq.].88
GRI 1 states "classification shall be determined according
to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chap-
ter notes." 9
After considering the statute itself, the CIT regularly con-
sults the legislative history of the term. Although the resort to
legislative history in Chevron analysis has been challenged by
Justice Scalia, it is considered in step one of Chevron by many
courts." The CIT has often held that absent contrary legisla-
tive intent, HTSUS terms are to be "construed [according] to
their common and popular meaning."91 Thus, the CIT refers
to the legislative history of tariff statutes to ascertain
Congress' precise meaning. In classification cases, the legisla-
tive history is found in the Explanatory Notes92 and in the
87. Preface to the Eleventh Edition of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, available at http://www.customs.treas.govimpoexpo/impoexpo.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2000).
88. Id. "Such elements as the Table of Contents, footnotes, Schedule C and
Schedule D, and published index are inserted for ease of reference only." Id.
89. HTSUS, supra note 86, Gen. R. Interp. 1.
90. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Justice Scalia concurring
in judgment, but challenging the Court's use of the legislative history to bolster its
holding). See also United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505
(1992); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
91. Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
92. Convention on Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods in Customs
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International Trade Committee's Report and Conversion Ta-
bles,93 documenting the transition from the Tariff Schedule of
the United States ("TSUS")94 to the HTSUS. The Explanatory
Notes are non-binding interpretations of the HTSUS developed
by the World Customs Organization. 95 The conversion tables
provide a reference between the HTSUS and its predecessor,
the Tariff Schedule of the United States."5 Where the statuto-
ry language of the HTSUS is clear, resort to the TSUS is not
necessary.97
The CIT also may inquire into the common and popular
meaning of a tariff term absent contrary legislative intent."
Where the meaning of a tariff term cannot be ascertained from
the term itself or the legislative history, the court will ascribe
meaning by looking at the common commercial understanding
of the term.99 Thus, the common and commercial meaning
Tariffs, Dec. 15, 1950, 347 U.N.T.S. 127. The Brussels Nomenclature is treated as
legislative history where the terms of the HTSUS and the nomenclature are very
siniliar. West Bend Co., Div. of Dart Indus., Inc. v. United States, 892 F.2d 69
(1989); Karoware, Inc. v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 402 (Oust. Ct. 1976), judg-
ment affd, 564 F.2d 77 (1977).
93. Continuity of Import and Export Trade Statistics After Implementation of
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, USITC Pub. 2051
(Jan. 1988) [hereinafter ITC Report]; ITC Report, Annex I [hereinafter Conversion
Tables]; H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 549-50 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1582-83 (Conference Report); Conversion of the Tariff Schedules of the Unit-
ed States Annotated into the Nomenclature Structure of the Harmonized System:
Report on Investigation No. 332-131 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
USITC Pub. 1400 (June 1983).
94. See discussion of Lonza, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir.
1995), infra note 115.
95. See id. at 1109 ("While the Explanatory Notes do not constitute controlling
legislative history, they do offer guidance in interpreting HTSUS subheadings.").
Sometimes the guidance offered by the notes is not helpful due to commercial
advances in a particular industry. See, e.g., Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States,
821 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
96. See ITC Report, supra note 93; see Conversion Tables, supra note 93.
97. See Pima W., Inc. v. United States, 915 F. Supp. 399, 404-405 (1996).
[Diecisions by the Customs Service and the courts interpreting nomencla-
ture under the TSUS are not to be deemed dispositive in interpreting the
HTS. Nevertheless, on a case-by-case basis prior decisions should be
considered instructive in interpreting the HTS, particularly where the
nomenclature previously interpreted in those decisions remains unchanged
and no dissimilar interpretation is required by the text of the HTS.
H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 549-50 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1582-
83.
98. See Linteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting E.M. Chems. v. United States, 920 F.2d 910, 913 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
99. See GKD-USA, Inc. v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 875 (Ct. Int'l Trade
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doctrine is often encountered if a resort to GRI 1 and legisla-
tive history fails to supply guidance. 0 "To assist it in ascer-
taining the common meaning of a tariff term, the court may
rely upon its own understanding of the terms used, and it may
consult lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries,
and other reliable information sources."10' In classification
cases, customs tribunals have employed an endless litany of
dictionaries, technical manuals, experts, and scientific authori-
ties to extract an understanding of a term. Additionally, some
specific tariff terms are subject to a "use" test such that an
article will be classified according to its use.102 Where "use"
provisions are concerned, the meaning of the tariff term is in
part defined by the principle use or actual use of the object at
issue. Beyond the above tools, the court, as a specialized court,
frequently reviews its own history of interpretation and can
adapt judicial interpretations and aids in statutory construc-
tion.
Lastly, the CIT employs more traditional methods of statu-
tory construction including the canons of construction and the
general interpretive principles. The canons of construction, as
well as traditional tools of statutory construction, play an im-
portant part in step one of the Chevron review. Some have
commented that it would be odd for the canons of construction
to provide Congress' precise intention on a point.' 3 Rather,
canons of construction are seen as rules which should be gen-
erally followed and will allow the court to impute the answer
to a particular question. 4
1996). The court may use its own understandings as well as resort to lexicons,
dictionaries or other scientific authority. See also Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. Unit-
ed States, 847 F.2d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988).
100. "In the absence of a precise definition appearing in the HTSUS, the cor-
rect meaning of a term is usually resolved by ascertaining its common and com-
mercial meaning." Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1133,
1139 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
101. Semperitt Indus. Products, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1292, 1298
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1994); Linteq, Inc., 976 F.2d at 697 (quoting Brookside Veneers,
Ltd. v. United States, 6 Fed. Cir. 121, 125, 847 F.2d 786, 789, cert. denied, 488
U.S. 943 (1988)).
102. See STURM, supra note 68, at 53.3.
103. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 998 (1991).
104. But see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
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As previously indicated, most often the CIT employs its
unique interpretive tools (for example, common and commer-
cial meaning), as well as the more traditional statutory inter-
pretation tools, in classification cases. However, the CIT uses
some of these tools and its unique expertise to ascertain the
statutory meaning outside of the classification context. The
CIT approaches interpretation on a case by case basis even
outside of the classification context and appears able to use its
interpretative expertise to examine the statute holistically to
resolve any ambiguities.
B. The HTSUS and its Interpretative Components
The application of the HTSUS, GRIs, and section and
chapter notes works in a relatively straightforward, even me-
chanical, way. For example, in Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Unit-
ed States,"5 an importer challenged Customs' classification of
"capillary membrane" under "synthetic monofilament," sub-
heading, 5404.10.8080,1"6 HTSUS or as part of an "artificial
respiration apparatus" in subheading 9019.20.0000,
HTSUS,"'0 because it was a part of a larger machine,0 8 or
as part of yet a larger machine, an "electro-medical apparatus"
subheading 9018.90.7080, HTSUS.0 9
Thus, the threshold issue was the meaning of the various
tariff terms. According to the GRIs, the merchandise would be
classified in the most specific alternative. Typically, in customs
classification cases, at issue are the meanings of at least two
tariff terms. Usually, Customs claims that one provision best
describes the article, while the importer claims that a (several)
different provision best describes the article. Thus, the CIT
had to ascribe a specific contextual meaning to an arguably
ambiguous term to ascertain whether a particular product fell
within that term's definition. The plaintiff argued that the
government's preferred choice, the "synthetic monofilament,"
required a product to be both "synthetic" and a "monofila-
105. 998 F. Supp. 1133 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
106. Dutiable at a rate of 7.8% ad valorem as a "synthetic monofilament of 67
decitex or more and of which no cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1mm." Id.
107. 9019.20.0000, HTSUS. Dutiable at 4.2% ad valorem. See id.
108. Specifically the membrane was an integral part of the plaintiffs UNIVOX
blood oxygenator. See id.
109. Dutiable at 3.8% ad valorem. See id.
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ment." The plaintiff argued that the merchandise was neither
"synthetic" nor a "monofilament."
Despite the plaintiffs attractive argument that the term
"synthetic monofilament," requires a product that was both
"synthetic" and "monofilament," the government argued the
CIT should use the Chapter Notes to the HTSUS to interpret
the terms. Note 1 of Chapter 54 provided a definition of syn-
thetics." Thus, as a threshold matter the chapter notes indi-
cated that the membrane should be included in the definition
of synthetic in Chapter 54. Resort to the GRIs bolstered this
view. GRI 2(b) provides: "Any reference in a heading to a mate-
rial or substance shall be taken to include a reference to mix-
tures or combinations of that material or substance with other
materials or substances. Any reference to goods of a given
material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to
goods consisting wholly or partly of such material or sub-
stance... .""' Thus, the court could conclude in accordance
with GRI 2(b) and the Notes to Chapter 54, that (1) the mem-
brane was synthetic within meaning of HTSUS classification;
and, (2) the membrane was properly classified as a material,
rather than a part."2 Further, the government claimed that
according to the HTSUS and the Explanatory Notes,"' the
merchandise at issue was not part of another article but "is
simply a material.""
C. Explanatory Notes and the Legislative History of Tariff
Terms
In Baxter, the court also considered the Explanatory Notes'
description of "monofilament." As previously explained, the
Explanatory Notes are non-binding interpretations of the
HTSUS developed by the World Customs Organization."5 As
110. HTSUS Note 1, ch. 54. Additionally, the General Explanatory Notes listed
examples of synthetic fibers to describe polyurethane as resulting from the poly-
merization of polyfunctional isocyanates with polyhydroxl compounds, such as cas-
tor oil, and thus contemplated the inclusion of oils in the production of synthetic
fibers.
111. HTSUS, Gen. R. Interp. 2(b).
112. Meaning it had an existence of use independent of being used for incorpo-
ration within this specific issue.
113. Discussed more fully below, infra note 115 and accompanying text.
114. Baxter, 998 F. Supp. at 1137-38.
115. See Lonza, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1109 ("While the Explanatory Notes do not
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the CIT noted "[t]he General Explanatory Notes to heading
5404 help provide a definition of the term monofilament."'16
The Explanatory Notes provides:
This heading covers: ... (1) Synthetic monofilament.
These are filaments extruded as single filaments. They are
classified here only if they measure 67 decitex or more and do
not exceed 1 mm in any cross-sectional dimension. Monofila-
ment of this heading may be of any cross-sectional config-
uration and may be obtained not only by extrusion but by
lamination or fusion.... All these products are generally in
long lengths, but remain classified here even if cut into short
lengths and whether or not put up for retail sale. They are
used according to their different characteristics in the manu-
facture of brushes, sports rackets, fishing lines, surgical su-
tures, upholstery fabrics, belts, millinery, braids, etc,117
Thus, in Baxter the CIT noted "[tihe HTSUS does not define
the term "monofilament" and uses the Explanatory Notes, as
well as the common and commercial meaning doctrine, to de-
fine the term."1 Once the term was defined, the CIT had no
problem in finding it "clear... that Customs correctly classi-
fied the merchandise as a synthetic monofilament."1 The
Explanatory Notes will not always be able to provide a defini-
tive definition of a term, however, they are frequently help-
ful.120
constitute controlling legislative history, they do offer guidance in interpreting
HTSUS subheadings.").
116. Baxter, 998 F. Supp. at 1141.
117. Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, Explanatory Notes
to Heading 54.04 (1986).
118. Baxter, 998 F. Supp. at 1141.
119. Id.
120. In Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) the issue was whether sport
utility vehicles, specifically, Nissan Pathfinders were "trucks" under heading 8704,
HTSUS "Motor vehicles for the transport of goods," or "cars" under heading 8703,
"Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of per-
sons . .. ." The Explanatory Notes played a less important role in this case be-
cause they failed to speak directly to the issue. Although the vehicle literally fit
the Explanatory Note definition of a station wagon, the definition, however, likely
would encompass some vans as well. The court noted that "[miost likely the sta-
tion wagon definition was not meant to cover vans that do not have tailgates. A
tailgate is one of the hallmarks of a "voiture du type 'break'," which is the French
term for "station wagon" as used in the Explanatory Note. Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System, Heading No. 87.03 (1st ed. 1987). On the other
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D. The Common and Commercial Meaning of the Tariff Term
In determining the common and commercial meaning of a
tariff term, the court is free to consult both dictionaries and
experts. For example, in Toyota Motor Sales v. United
States,2' the issue was whether an imported cab chassis
came within the common meaning of the eo nomine provision
for chassis for automobile trucks and motor buses. The court
stated tariff terms are properly construed "in accordance with
their common and commercial meaning, and it is presumed
that Congress frames the tariff acts according to the general
usage and denomination of the trade."'22 While answering the
"question of a term's common meaning courts may consult
dictionaries, lexicons, scientific authorities and other reliable
sources as an aid,"' these sources are to be used to ascer-
tain the "meaning... given [to] a descriptive term used in a
tariff act is that which it had at the time of the law's enact-
ment.
,,A2
The court then used the definition of chassis contained in
the Handbook of the Society of Automotive Engineers (1963)
(SAE Handbook)" which did not include cabs in the defini-
tion of chasses.126 Going beyond this authoritative source, the
hand, as indicated, traditional station wagons are not off-road vehicles. Thus, the
Explanatory Note defining station wagons should not be read too literally.
Marubeni, 821 F. Supp at 1523.
121. 585 F. Supp. 649 (Ct. Infl Trade 1984).
122. Id. at 653 (citing Nylos Trading Co. v. United States, 37 C.C.P.A. 71,
C.A.D. 422 (1949)). Further the court added it would apply the common meaning
rule within the time of enactment qualification.
123. C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 673 F.2d 1268 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
124. Toyota, 585 F. Supp. at 653 (citing United States v. 0. Brager-Larsen, 36
C.C.P.A. 1, 3-4, C.A.D. 388 (1948)). A later meaning however, may aid in the
clarification of the definition.
125. Under the section entitled, "Commercial Motor Vehicle Nomenclature--SAE
J687a," "motor vehicle chassis" is defined as the basic operative motor vehicle
including engine, frame, and other essential structure and mechanical parts, but
exclusive of body and all appurtenances for the accommodation of operator, proper-
ty or passengers, and/or appliances or equipment related to other than locomotion
and control. If a cab is included, the designation should be: MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS WITH CAB.
126. See Toyota, 585 F. Supp. at 654, stating:
The court considers this SAE definition to be a highly authorita-
tive source of industry nomenclature, particularly since the SAE is an
organization which represents all aspects of the automotive industry. The
definition is the work product of the SAE Commercial Vehicle Nomencla-
BROOK. J. INTL L.
CIT considered a variety of sources including: Funk &
Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Ency-
clopedia Americana, McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and
Technology, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, McGraw-Hill
Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms, Collier's Encyclope-
dia, and The New Encyclopedia Britannica. The litany of lexi-
cons listed by the CIT responded to the wealth of industry
testimony showing industry usage of the terms. The CIT found
that testimony to common meanings would be insufficient to
overcome the dictonary definition. 2 ' Admittedly, there was a
great deal of conflict in the industry as to industry usage, thus
the court chose to rely on the lexicographic sources.128
The CIT's resort to dictionaries and experts seems reflex-
ive at times. Given the normative goals of customs laws, and
tariff classification in particular, this is a natural reflex. Cus-
toms statutes promote the fair assessment and imposition of
duties consistent with foreign trade and policy objectives.
These goals are intertwined with market forces and structures.
The CIT, therefore, is challenged to make its determinations
across a variety of commerce sectors consistently taking into
account industry standards and definitions. Resort to objective
criteria such as industry experts or dictionaries is natural.
Likewise, the CIT respects the commercial and industry prac-
tices outside of the classification realm, when interpreting
tariff terms that implicate business practices or common com-
mercial dealings.
E. The Canons of Construction
The CIT can consider and employ the canons of construc-
tion in ascribing the meaning of a tariff term. For example, in
Totes, Inc. v. United States,'29 the court considered whether
ture Committee whose purpose it is to formulate standard nomenclature
within the truck industry. The process begins with a staff engineer who
drafts a definition. The Committee reviews this draft over an extensive
period of time, and then circulates it to a broad cross section of the
industry, including governmental agencies, for review before final publica-
tion in the SAE Handbook. Considering the great care and
exhaustiveness of the process, the SAE definition is entitled to great
weight.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. 865 F. Supp. 867 (1994).
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trunk organizers used to organize and store automotive tools
and supplies in motor vehicles were properly classifiable with-
in subheading 4202.92.9020, HTSUS which includes "trunks,
suitcases, jewelry boxes, cutlery cases, and tool bags, rather
than as parts of motor vehicles." The court considered the
canon of construction ejusdem generis"' requiring that where
particular words of description are followed by general terms,
the general terms will be regarded as applying to things of a
like class as those listed in the particular words of descrip-
tion.'' The CIT found that the trunk organizers possessed
the same characteristics and common purpose as the exem-
plars listed in the tariff heading. Thus, using the canon of
construction ejusdem generis, the court found that the organiz-
ers were properly classified within the "trunks" heading, rather
than as "other automotive parts" or "other textiles.""2
Conversely, in Supermarket Systems, U.S. Inc., v. United
States,"' the CIT considered the classification of Openmatic
automatic entry gates (steel devices equipped with a gate arm
and alarm and are placed at the entrance way of public build-
ings). Customs classified the merchandise under TSUS 653.30
as "other structures and parts of structures ... of iron or
steel." Plaintiff challenged the classification and argued it
should be classified under item TSUS 685.50 as "other sound
or visual signaling apparatus.""4 The court examined wheth-
er the term "structure" as used in TSUS item 653.30 was in-
tended by Congress to include devices such as the Openmatic.
Using some of the tools discussed in prior sections the CIT
considered the alternate headings itself, but found they did not
specifically enumerate the gates.
The CIT then resorted to the common and commercial
meaning. "' Both plaintiff and Customs offered dictionary
130. See id. (citing United States v. C.J. Tower, 44 C.C.P.A. 1, 5 (1956)). See
Supermarket Sys., U.S., Inc. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 907, 913 (1989)
(citing DRI Indus., Inc. v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 528, 532 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), affd, 832 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
131. See Supermarket Sys., 13 Ct. Int'l Trade at 913 (citing DRI Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 657 F. Supp. 528, 532 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 832 F.2d 155
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
132. Totes, Inc., 865 F. Supp. at 871.
133. Supermarket Sys., 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 907 (1989).
134. Id. at 908.
135. See id.
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definitions of "structure." The plaintiff also used expert witness
testimony to describe the proper definition of the term. The
witness offered evidence that the device was not intended to be
a structure because it "bore no load."13' The CIT held that
the dictionary definitions and expert witness failed to supply
the meaning of the term "structure."137
Employing the canons of construction, the CIT considered
whether the automatic gate at issue was of the same class of
merchandise as the exemplars listed in the proposed tariff
heading defining "structure," i.e hangars, buildings, bridges,
towers, roofs, columns, pillars, shutters, and balustrades. The
CIT found that the exemplars had no unifying criteria such
that the ejusdem generis could not aid in the interpretive pro-
cess. Finding no basis to assign any of the alternative eo nomi-
ne subheadings, the CIT eventually resorted to GRI 3(c) to find
that the merchandise should be classified in the "basket" provi-
sion.13' Thus, even when the plain language of the statute,
the legislative history, the common and commercial meaning
doctrine, expert testimony, and the canons of construction
failed to define the meaning of a tariff term, the CIT could still
use the GRIs to resolve the classification issue at hand.
F. Non-Classification Cases
It may seem obvious that the CIT's long history of inde-
pendently using a host of interpretive tools to dissect or con-
struct the meaning of a tariff term for classification purposes is
beyond dispute. But the CIT's use of its interpretive repertoire
extends beyond the typical classification cases which involve
statutory interpretation of a unique statute, the HTSUS. The
CIT can and does use its interpretive tools and expertise in the
non-classification arena to interpret tariff terms involving
valuation, country of origin, and a host of other customs stat-
utes.
136. Id. at 911.
137. See id. at 913.
138. See HTSUS, supra note 86, Gen. R. Interp. (3)(c) (explaining that when
applying the preceding general rules of interpretation (GRIs) and the subject mer-
chandise is subject to classification in alternative headings, "they shall be classified
under the heading which occurs last in numerical order among those which equal-
ly merit consideration."). Id. As previously indicated, the GRIs are part of the
HTSUS statute. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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For example, the issue in Nissho Iwai American Corp. v.
United States"9 was the meaning of the term "price actually
paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation"
in the customs valuation statute." ° Under Customs' interpre-
tation of the phrase "sold for exportation," the sale from the
foreign manufacturer to a middleman was not "for exporta-
tion."' The CAFC set aside the agency's interpretation
based on the court's independent analysis of the statute.4
The court found that a sale could be a "sale for exportation"
when "the goods are clearly destined for export to the United
States and when the manufacturer and the middleman deal
with each other at arm's length, in the absence of any non-
market influences that affect the legitimacy of the sales
price." Thus, the court found that whether the first sale or
middleman's sale would be used to appraise the imports de-
pends on a case-by-case factual analysis.'
Recently, in Salant Corporation v. United States, 45 the
CIT employed many of the aforementioned interpretive tools to
ascertain the meaning of a statutory term in a valuation case.
At issue was whether "fabric waste" fell within the meaning of
"merchandise consumed" in the production of the imported
goods. The value of "merchandise consumed" in the production
of imported goods would be included in the value of those
goods as a statutory assist.46 Although the government ar-
gued that Chevron deference applied, Judge Barzilay's compre-
hensive and cogent opinion avoided step two of Chevron analy-
sis by using the set of interpretive tools at the court's disposal.
First, the court examined the statute itself in conjunction with
various dictionary definitions. "The term consume ... is de-
fined as 'to utilize (an economic good) in the satisfaction of
wants or the process of production'." 47 Thereafter, the court
139. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
140. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) (1999).
141. C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Oust. B. & Dec. 811, 813 (1983).
142. See Nissho Iwai, 982 F.2d at 509.
143. Id.
144. See id. The court also examined the legislative history of the Trade Agree-
ments Act to conclude that the statute does not require it to assess whether one
permissible "transaction value" was more appropriate than another. Id. at 511.
145. 86 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000).
146. See id. at 1304.
147. Id. at 1305 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
490 (1993)).
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considered the statute's structure and legislative history. The
court agreed with the government's view of the legislative
history that "a goal of the new valuation code [was] 'to ensure
that these new rules are fair and simple, conform to commer-
cial reality, and allow traders to predict, with a reasonable
degree of accuracy, the duty that will be assessed on their
products'. " 14 8 The CIT specifically rejected the notion that it
had to reach the deference step of Chevron analysis finding
that "congressional intent is made clear by the plain language
of the statute combined with its structure and history as well
as the commercial reality of the industry."' Salant Corpora-
tion demonstrated that most of the CIT's interpretive tools are
applicable in non-classification cases.
Finally, the court is able to look beyond its tools and take
a holistic look at the statute. In Goodman Manufacturing v.
United States, 50 the issue involved a challenge to Customs'
interpretation of the valuation provision under the Foreign
Trade Zones ("FTZ") Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81(c). The importer had
claimed that the dutiable value of recoverable waste should be
calculated by the value of steel from which the waste came,
whereas customs regulations provided for the value to be de-
ducted according to the transaction value for the steel sold as
scrap. Even though Customs had issued regulations in light of
an ambiguous statute, the Court rejected its interpretation and
still sought to interpret the statute according to the holistic
approach. "Statutory interpretation 'is a holistic endeavor.' A
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clari-
fied by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because...
only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law."'' The
court proceeded to demonstrate how the legislative history
failed to shed an interpretative light on this holistic endeavor;
however, the statutory context illuminated the question amply:
Section 81(c) states that recoverable waste "shall be
dutiable and taxable in its condition and quantity and at its
weight at the time of entry" into customs territory. Under the
applicable regulation, the dutiable value of the steel waste is
148. Id. at 1306 (citations omitted).
149. Id at 1308.
150. 69 F.3d 505 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
151. Id. at 510.
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determined by "the price actually paid or payable to the zone
seller in the transaction that caused the recoverable waste or
scrap to be transferred from the zone." 19 C.F.R. §
146.65(b)(2). These two mandates, along with the statutorily
prescribed method of calculating the pre-allowance dutiable
value of the privileged foreign steel, demonstrate how to
calculate the maximum amount on which a zone manufac-
turer could be assessed duties. Any method for calculating
the allowance must result in the amount of duty on both
privileged steel and on privileged steel waste prescribed by
the statute and regulations. 52
Thus, the court found that the allowance for a deduction for
the waste would be the difference between the cost of the steel
which was scrap and the value of the scrapped steel.'
IV. CONCLUSIONS ON STEP ONE
With such an array of specific interpretative tools, general
rules of statutory interpretation and the availability of a holis-
tic approach in the final analysis, it seems probable that Chev-
ron, step two, often need not be reached in customs cases.
Moreover, the possibilities of different interpretations may not
equal ambiguity in the first instance."M Admittedly, the infi-
nitely changing number of products and customs issues cau-
tions that Congress could not have always spoken to the pre-
cise issue at hand. But, because of these same factors, it seems
Congress already had devised a unique methodology to account
for its institutional inadequacies.
152. Id. at 511.
153. See id.
154. Marcor Dev. Corp. v. United States, 20 Ct. Intl Trade 538, 926 F. Supp.
1124, 18 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1639 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). "The fact that there are two
possible definitions does not in and of itself render the statute ambiguous. It is
well settled that "ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of
statutory context." Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)). The CIT is
more willing than most to search for context and quite simply has more hiding
places for it. "When a tariff term has various definitions or meanings and has
broad and narrow interpretations, the court must determine which definition best
invokes the legislative intent." Marubeni Am. Corp., 905 F. Supp. at 1105 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995). See also Richards Med. Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830-31
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Clipper Belt Lacer Co., Inc. v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 528,
534 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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If the Chevron/Haggar approach applies outside of legisla-
tive rules, interpretation of the tariff nomenclature in classifi-
cation cases-which represent the majority of case law in recent
years-may well be a special situation in which the distinctive
rules of statutory interpretation for customs classification en-
able the court, in all cases, to interpret the tariff provisions
unambiguously and decide the case in the first step of the
Chevron methodology. Therefore, if the Chevron/Haggar ap-
proach applies outside of legislative rules, the impact appears
to be in non-classification cases.'55 Yet, even in the non-clas-
sification cases, it seems that the CIT still has a wide variety
of interpretive tools which it may and should use in step one of
Chevron analysis.
Both U.S. Shoe and Haggar leave unresolved questions for
the CIT to address. The jurisdictional solution in U.S. Shoe
seems unfulfilling and perhaps is one more straw on the
camel's back and suggests a new jurisdictional camel may be
in order. The remnants of Haggar Apparel are more far reach-
ing. But, it appears here the CIT has ample tools to address
the cases that will come before it ... if only it will use them.
155. One commentator has argued that Chevron deference is appropriate in
classification cases as Congress, in its legislative history, stated that Customs was
to be "responsible for interpreting and applying the HTSUS." Carla Garcia-Benitez,
The "Deference to the Agency" Doctrine: To What Extent Should it Apply to the
Customs Service's Interpretation of a Tariff Term in Classification Cases? 20
BROOK J. INTL L. 577, 580 (1995).
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